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Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring

Daripa, Arup

Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring 2008 - 2008 - 147-163 V. 86 Issue. 01

Subjects--Topical Terms:
Economic Development

Subjects--Index Terms: Informal credit;Adverse selection;Moral hazard;Pricing Participation in investment;Cream skimming;Local information;

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