Pragmatic approach to agency in group activity / Herman Witzel.
Material type: TextSeries: Practical philosophy ; volume 23Publisher: Berlin : De Gruyter, [2020]Description: viii, 172 pages : illustrations ; 24 cmISBN:- 9783110628111
- 9783110628111 (hbk)
- 128.4 WIT
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Books | H.T. Parekh Library | SIAS Collection | 128.4 WIT (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | K3041 |
Browsing H.T. Parekh Library shelves, Collection: SIAS Collection Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
128.4 BAK Toward a philosophy of the act / | 128.4 FOD Psychosemantics: the problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind / | 128.4 TAY Seeing silence / | 128.4 WIT Pragmatic approach to agency in group activity / | 128.46 BAD In praise of love / | 128.5 BUT What world is this?: a pandemic phenomenology / | 128.5 KAM Philosophy of life and death / |
TRP40/03
Euro 79.95/-
Includes bibliographical references (pages 164-167) and index.
A Pragmatic Approach to Agency in Group Activity builds towards an action theory that explains how new forms agency develop in group activity. The approach starts from practical insights about group activity and develops a new understanding of agency from there.
This study shows how practical interactions and structures in group activity disrupt individual agency. It is concluded that important features of agency can be realized on a group level. Different types of group activities are analyzed in order to better understand these mechanisms and, consequently, revisit our understanding of agency. It is argued that „intentionality,“ the key concept in individual action theory, merely serves as a pseudo-explanatory connection between specific features of agency and their realization in humans. This is contrasted with empirical research showing that how humans act is far from the idealized concept of intentionality. Consequently, intentionality as a key explanatory concept is rejected and replaced by a diverse set of features of agency for a similarly diverse set of kinds of agency. In this view, groups display new forms agency beyond individual agency without making the groups agents themselves. Such is the nature of group agency.
There are no comments on this title.