Strategy : an introduction to game theory / Joel Watson.
Material type: TextPublication details: New Delhi Viva Books c2010Edition: 2nd edDescription: xvii, 404 p. : ill. ; 23 cmISBN:- 9788130915999
- 330.015193 WAT
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Books | H.T. Parekh Library | SIAS Collection | 330.015193 WAT (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | K3553 |
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330.0151 SYD Essential mathematics for economic analysis / | 330.0151 SYD Essential mathematics for economic analysis / | 330.015193 PAS Course in networks and markets: game-theoretic models and reasoning / | 330.015193 WAT Strategy : | 330.015195 ANG Mastering 'metrics: the path from cause to effect / | 330.015195 ANG Mastering 'metrics: the path from cause to effect / | 330.015195 ANG Mostly harmless econometrics: an empiricist's companion / |
Rs.595/-
AT/3010235/04
Includes bibliographical references and index.
The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location and partnership -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Backward induction and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions; negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation.
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