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Central bank independence, fiscal responsibility and the goals of macroeconomic policy

By:

Bryant R.C

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: 1996 Brookings Institute WashingtonDescription: See BI 337 LUS (Includes Acc. Nos. 18896, 18897, 18898 & 18899) 28 pSubject(s):

Macroeconomics

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Item type	Current library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Books	H.T. Parekh Library	BI 337 BRY (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Weeded Out		18897

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Previous	BI 337 BRY The "exchange risk premium," uncovered unterest parity, and the treatment of exchange rates in multicountry macroeconomic models	BI 337 BRY Intertemporal fiscal policy in macroeconomic models Brooking DP in Int.Eco.123	BI 337 BRY Alternative specifications for intertemporal fiscal policy in a small theoretical model Bro DP IE. 124	BI 337 BRY Central bank independence, fiscal responsibility and the goals of macroeconomic policy	BI 337 BRY Alternative rules for monetary policy and fiscal policy in New Zealand	BI 337 CLA Summary and comments on the Brooking workshop on the evolution of the international monetary fund	BI 337 COL Economic integration: conflict versus cohesion	Next

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