Federalism and the market: intergivernmental conflict and economic reform in the developing world
Material type: TextPublication details: 2005 Cambridge University Press CambridgeDescription: 276 p. 24 cm ; HardISBN:- 0-521-84381-2
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Books | H.T. Parekh Library | GSB Collection | 338.90091724 WIB (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 28845 |
Rs.3365/-
1. Intergovernmental Bargaining and Economic Policy in Federations
2. From Market-Preserving to Market-Distorting Federalism: Divergent Incentives and Economic Reform in Developing Nations
3. Federalism and the Decentralized Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance
4. Testing the Model: Macroeconomic Reform Beyond the Federal-Unitary Distinction
5. Partisan Harmony, Intergovernmental Coordination, and Market Transitions: The Case of Argentina
6. Regional Competition, Fiscal Dependence, and Incentives in the Argentine Provinces
7. The View from Below: The Politics of Public Sector Reform in Three Argentine Provinces
8. Conclusion: Federalism, Reform, and Enduring Puzzles.
This research develops a new comparative model of intergovernmental bargaining to account for variation in the capacity of federations in the developing world to undertake economic policy reform. The book suggests that many market reform policies are a function of a constant process of bargaining between national and regional leaders struggling for political survival. As the degree of national-regional disagreement
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